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ABSTRACT 
As the number of wireless telephone users continues to 
proliferate, so does the number of lawsuits against wireless service 
providers.  While consumers seek to utilize various consumer-
friendly state law causes of action, the wireless industry continues 
to push for a uniform federal regulatory regime.  Ambiguous 
language in the Federal Communications Act of 1934 (“FCA”) and 
disagreement among the federal circuits has led to much confusion 
over whether state law claims affecting wireless rates and market 
entry are removable to federal court by way of “complete 
preemption.”  This iBrief argues that FCA’s preemption power is 
limited by its savings clause, failure to establish a comprehensive 
regulatory scheme, and provision of a significant role for state 
regulation.  Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit erred in Bastien v. 
AT&T Wireless Services, Inc. when it concluded that the FCA 
completely preempts certain state law claims against wireless 
service providers and thereby requires their removal to federal 
court. 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 In the last decade, wireless telephone usage in the United States has 
grown at an extraordinary rate.  Between 1998 and 2003, the number of 
wireless subscribers exploded from 69.2 million to 158.7 million.2  During 
the same time period, the usage of wireless service (also known as 
commercial mobile radio service, or “CMRS”) quintupled from 143 to 813 
average monthly minutes of use per subscriber.3  Not surprisingly, the rapid 
                                                     
1 J.D. Candidate, 2006, Duke University School of Law; B.A. in Political 
Science, 2003, Rutgers University.  The author would like to thank Professor 
Francesca Bignami for her assistance in preparing this iBrief. 
2 Leonard J. Kennedy & Heather A. Purcell, Wandering Along the Road to 
Competition and Convergence—The Changing CMRS Roadmap, 56 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 489, 561 (2004).   
3 Id.  The Kennedy & Purcell article contains a typographical error labeling 
these numbers as 143 and 813 “billion” average minutes of use.  However, Ms. 
Purcell informed the author that the numbers actually represent the average 
monthly minutes of use per subscriber. 
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growth of users has coincided with an increasing number of consumer 
lawsuits against wireless service providers over poor service quality and 
suspicious “routine billing practices.”4   
¶2 In order to alleviate the litigation burden, the wireless industry 
advocates limiting state court jurisdiction over claims against wireless 
service providers.5  This position has been countered by plaintiffs’ 
attorneys, who generally prefer litigating in state court, and those who argue 
that state laws are vital to protecting consumers from illicit business 
practices.6  These diverging interests have been complicated by the Federal 
Communications Act of 19347 (“FCA”), which preempts state regulation 
over certain aspects of wireless service by granting the Federal 
Communications Commission (“FCC”) the exclusive authority to regulate 
these areas.8  Yet, the FCA does not clearly delineate which aspects of 
                                                     
4 Id. at 514.  See also Can You Legislate the Right to Decent Customer Service?, 
MOBILE BUS. ADVISOR, May/June 2003, at 12 (“The number of complaints to 
the FCC regarding wireless services jumped 53 percent in 2002, and many of the 
major mobile carriers are facing class action law suits. Topping the list of 
subscriber complaints were billing inaccuracies, early contract termination 
problems, and service quality, according to the FCC.”); Salina Khan, Spotty 
Service Irks Cellphone Users, USA TODAY, Nov. 6, 2000, at 1A (describing the 
growing number of consumer complaints and lawsuits regarding poor service 
quality); Elizabeth Douglass, Dial M for Misleading? Complaints and Lawsuits 
Against Wireless Phone Companies are Climbing, with Users Unhappy About 
Everything from Billing Practices to Substandard Service., L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19, 
2000, at V2 (discussing common consumer complaints against wireless 
companies). 
5 Kennedy & Purcell, supra note 2, at 517.  
6 See Cedar Rapids Cellular Tel., L.P. v. Miller, 280 F.3d 874, 880 (8th Cir. 
2002) (“[S]tates have an important interest in protecting the public from 
deceptive business practices.”); Union Ink Co., Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 801 A.2d 
361, 37475 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (discussing the need to preserve 
state laws that “govern the relationships between parties to consumer 
transactions” and reasoning that “a state court should not sacrifice the public 
policies of the State to some ephemeral view of the federal interest”); Erik B. 
Walker, Keep Your Case in State Court, TRIAL, Sept. 2004, available at 
http://www.atla.org/Publications/trial/0409/walker.aspx (“Plaintiff attorneys’ 
preference for state courts is undisputed and understandable.”).  See also Kevin 
M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything 
About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. 
REV. 581, 593 (1998) (showing that “[r]emoval of civil cases from state to 
federal court results in a precipitous drop in the plaintiffs’ win rate” when 
compared with cases originally filed in federal court).  
7 47 U.S.C. § 151, et seq. (2000) [hereinafter FCA]. 
8 Kennedy & Purcell, supra note 2, at 499.   
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wireless service may be regulated by the states.9  Ensuing litigation 
therefore has involved plaintiffs carefully pleading only state law claims to 
avoid FCC jurisdiction and wireless service providers arguing that these 
claims must be removed to federal court because they are preempted by the 
FCA.10  As the scope of FCA preemption is unclear, judicial analysis of the 
preemption question has been “inconsistent, unpredictable and often fact-
specific.”11 
¶3 Thus far, only two United States Circuit Courts of Appeals have 
addressed the issue directly.  In 1998, the Second Circuit, in Marcus v. 
AT&T Corp.,12 read the FCA’s preemption provision narrowly.13  Its narrow 
reading meant that even those claims that are preempted would still not be 
removable to federal court.  However, in 2000 the Seventh Circuit, in 
Bastien v. AT&T Wireless Services, Inc.,14 held that the FCA completely 
preempts any state law claim affecting service quality or rates charged to 
customers, therefore subjecting such claims to federal jurisdiction.15  As 
will be discussed in greater detail below, while the wireless industry 
immediately embraced the Bastien court’s holding, many state and federal 
district courts have not.  The scope of FCA preemption thus remains in 
dispute.   
¶4 Precisely which state claims are preempted is beyond the scope of 
this iBrief.  Rather, this iBrief argues that whatever the scope of the FCA’s 
preemption clause may be, Bastien misapplied the complete preemption 
doctrine in permitting the removal of the state claims to federal court.  
When compared with other statutes that have been found to completely 
preempt state regulations, it is clear that the FCA does not have the 
extraordinary preemptive force necessary to find complete preemption.  
After laying out the legal framework surrounding the FCA and complete 
preemption, this iBrief further analyzes Bastien through the prism of recent 
United States Supreme Court preemption jurisprudence.  This investigation 
                                                     
9 For the purposes of the FCA, state legislative, administrative, and judicial 
action all constitute state CMRS regulation.  In re Wireless Consumers Alliance, 
Inc., 15 F.C.C.R. 17021, 17027 (2000).  
10 See In re Southwestern Bell Mobile Sys., Inc., 14 F.C.C.R. 19898, 19901 
(1999) (noting that wireless service providers have “frequently asserted” that 
consumer suits are preempted by the FCA). 
11 Kennedy & Purcell, supra note 2, at 500 (comparing cases with nearly 
identical facts that reach opposite conclusions on the preemption question). 
12 138 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 1998). 
13 Id. at 54 (“The FCA not only does not manifest a clear Congressional intent to 
preempt state law actions prohibiting deceptive business practices, false 
advertisement, or common law fraud, it evidences Congress's intent to allow 
such claims to proceed under state law.”). 
14 205 F.3d 983 (7th Cir. 2000). 
15 Id. at 986-87. 
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shows that the FCA only supports a more limited form of federal 
preemption of state law claims against wireless service providers. 
I. BASTIEN’S LEGAL CONTEXT 
A. The Federal Communications Act of 1934 
¶5 As part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993,16 
Congress amended the FCA to “dramatically revise the regulation of the 
wireless telecommunications industry, of which cellular telephone service is 
a part.”17  The pertinent statutory language of the FCA provides that “[n]o 
State or local government shall have any authority to regulate the entry of or 
the rates charged by any commercial mobile service or any private mobile 
service, except that this paragraph shall not prohibit a State from regulating 
the other terms and conditions of commercial mobile services.”18 
¶6 As straightforward as this clause may seem, its preemptive effect on 
state law is unclear when read in conjunction with the FCA’s savings 
clause, which provides that “[n]othing in this chapter shall in any way 
abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but 
the provisions of this chapter are in addition to such remedies.”19 
¶7 As discussed below, much of the confusion over the FCA’s 
preemptive force has involved interpreting the meaning of “entry of or the 
rates charged” by wireless companies, and what is covered under “other 
terms and conditions.”  To help resolve this question, many of the courts 
evaluating the FCA’s preemptive force have relied on a report by the House 
of Representatives Budget Committee commenting on the proposed 
legislation.20  The report states: 
Section 332(c)(3) provides that state or local governments cannot 
impose rate or entry regulation on private land mobile service or 
commercial mobile services; this paragraph further stipulates that 
nothing here shall preclude a state from regulating the other terms and 
conditions of commercial mobile services. It is the intent of the 
Committee that the states still would be able to regulate the terms and 
conditions of these services. By "terms and conditions," the 
Committee intends to include such matters as customer billing 
                                                     
16 Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (1993) (codified in relevant part at 47 
U.S.C. § 332 (2000)). 
17 Conn. Dept. of Pub. Util. Control v. FCC, 78 F.3d 842, 845 (2d Cir. 1996). 
18 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A) (2000). 
19 Id. § 414. 
20 See, e.g., Moriconi v. AT&T Wireless PCS, LLC, 280 F. Supp. 2d 867, 873-
74 (E.D. Ark. 2003); Lewis v. Nextel Comms., Inc., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1306 
(N.D. Ala. 2003). 
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information and practices and billing disputes and other consumer 
protection matters; facilities siting issues (e.g., zoning); transfers of 
control; the bundling of services and equipment; and the requirement 
that carriers make capacity available on a wholesale basis or such 
other matters as fall within a state's lawful authority. This list is 
intended to be illustrative only and not meant to preclude other matters 
generally understood to fall under "terms and conditions."21  
¶8 While this paragraph assists courts in weeding out cases that clearly 
concern “other terms and conditions,” it has not been helpful in discerning 
which cases involve state regulation of “rates charged” by wireless service 
providers.  Some courts have interpreted “rates charged” expansively, 
encompassing any regulation that might have even an indirect impact on 
what a customer pays for wireless service.22  Other courts, however, have 
interpreted “rates charged” narrowly, including only those regulations that 
directly challenge the price charged by wireless service providers.23 
B. Complete Preemption and the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule 
¶9 To keep their claims in state court, many consumer-plaintiffs rely 
on the well-pleaded complaint rule.  The well-pleaded complaint rule 
governs the presence or absence of federal subject matter jurisdiction.  In 
general, a civil action filed in state court may be removed to federal court 
only if the claim is one “arising under” federal law.24  Where both state and 
federal law create a similar cause of action, a plaintiff, as “master of the 
claim,” may obtain federal jurisdiction by raising the federal claim or, 
conversely, “may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state 
law.”25  In light of this principle, the well-pleaded complaint rule provides 
that “federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on 
                                                     
21 H.R. Rep. No. 103-111 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 588.   
22 See, e.g., Bastien v. AT&T Wireless Svcs., Inc., 205 F.3d 983, 988 (7th Cir. 
2000) (“In practice, most consumer complaints will involve the rates charged by 
telephone companies or their quality of service.”). 
23 See, e.g., Cellco P’ship v. Hatch, Civ.04-2981 (JRT/SRN), 2004 WL 
2065807, at *4 (D. Minn. Sept. 3, 2004) (reasoning that although a state law 
regulating changes to service contracts “certainly implicates rates,” it does not 
constitute “impermissible rate regulation” because “[n]othing in the law 
prevents wireless providers from charging any rate the market will bear.” ); 
Moriconi, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 876 (“[A]ny challenge to a wireless service 
provider’s practices, if successful, is likely to impact rates . . ., but this indirect 
result does not convert such challenges into a direct challenge to rates and 
market entry contemplated by the preemptive language of the statute.”). 
24 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2000). 
25 Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).  
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the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.”26  Thus, a defendant 
cannot remove a case to federal court solely based on the defense that a 
plaintiff’s state law claim is preempted by federal law, even if the plaintiff’s 
complaint anticipates the possibility of federal preemption.27 
¶10 There are, however, two exceptions to this rule.  The first is 
complete preemption, which occurs when Congress intends the preemptive 
force of a statute to be “so ‘extraordinary’ that it ‘converts an ordinary state 
common-law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the 
well-pleaded complaint rule.’”28  From then on, “any claim purportedly 
based on that pre-empted state law is considered, from its inception, a 
federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law.”29   
¶11 Complete preemption should not be confused with the more 
familiar ordinary preemption.  While complete preemption serves as a 
means of circumventing the well-pleaded complaint rule and removing a 
case to federal court even though no federal claim is pleaded, ordinary 
preemption merely “operates to dismiss state claims on the merits and may 
be invoked in either federal or state court.”30  For example, in Lorillard 
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,31 the only consequence of the Supreme Court’s 
finding that certain state advertising laws were preempted by the Federal 
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act32 through ordinary preemption was 
that the plaintiff’s preempted state law claims were dismissed.33  
¶12 The second exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule is the 
artful pleading doctrine, which provides that “a plaintiff may not defeat 
removal by omitting to plead necessary federal questions.”34  Several 
federal courts have used this doctrine instead of the complete preemption 
doctrine to remove state law claims against wireless service providers to 
                                                     
26 Lewis v. Nextel Comms., Inc., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1303 (N.D. Ala. 2003) 
(quoting Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908)). 
27 Id. at 1303-04 (quoting Rivet v. Regions Bank, 522 U.S. 470, 475 (1998)). 
28 Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393 (quoting Metro. Life. Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 
58, 65 (1987)). 
29 Id.  
30 Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Blab TV 
of Mobile, Inc. v. Comcast Cable Comms., Inc., 182 F.3d 851, 855 (11th Cir. 
1999)). 
31 533 U.S. 525 (2001). 
32 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (2000). 
33 Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 553.  Cf. Bastien v. AT&T Wireless Svcs., 
Inc., 205 F.3d 983, 986 (7th Cir. 2000) (permitting plaintiff’s preempted claims 
to be removed to federal court upon finding complete preemption). 
34 Rivet v. Regions Bank, 522 U.S. 470, 475 (1998) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. 
of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 US. 1, 22 (1983)). 
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federal court.35  For the purposes of this iBrief, these cases are analogous to 
cases analyzing federal removal jurisdiction under the complete preemption 
doctrine since “complete preemption is a prerequisite for application of the 
artful pleading doctrine.”36 
¶13 Because complete preemption is only found “[w]hen federal 
common or statutory law so utterly dominates a preempted field that all 
claims brought within that field necessarily arise under federal law,” cases 
removing state law claims to federal court based on complete preemption 
are rare.37  As of this writing, the Supreme Court has only found complete 
preemption in the context of certain labor statutes and a few other 
specialized areas of federal law.38   
¶14 The unique policies underlying statutes that have the preemptive 
force necessary to circumvent the well-pleaded complaint rule are best 
appreciated by way of example.  Congress enacted the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 197439 (“ERISA”) in order to “provide a 
                                                     
35 See, e.g., Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. SACV 03-130 DOC, 2003 WL 
21530185, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2003) (“Plaintiffs claims challenging the 
expiration of unused minutes and delayed billing practices are artfully pled 
federal claims that raise a federal question.”). 
36 Nixon v. Nextel West Corp., 248 F. Supp. 2d 885, 893 (E.D. Mo. 2003) 
(citing Rivet, 522 U.S. at 475). 
37 Marcus v. AT&T Corp., 138 F.3d 46, 54 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing the 
“limited applicability of the complete preemption doctrine”).  See also Smith v. 
GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1311 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that complete 
preemption occurs under “rare circumstances”). 
38 See Metro. Life. Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1987) (holding state 
contract and tort claims completely preempted by the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974); Avco Corp. v. Machinists, 390 U.S. 557, 558 
(1968) (state law claims completely preempted by § 301 of the Labor 
Management Relations Act).  See also Beneficial Nat. Bank v. Anderson, 539 
U.S. 1, 11 (2003) (holding state law usury claims against national banks 
completely preempted by the National Bank Act); El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. 
Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 484 (1999) (holding tort actions arising out of nuclear 
accidents completely preempted by the Price-Anderson Act); Oneida Indian 
Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 678 (1974) (holding state claim 
regarding the right to possession of Indian tribal lands necessarily “arises under” 
several federal laws and treaties).  
39 Pub. L. No. 93-406, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq. (2000) [hereinafter 
ERISA].  ERISA is representative of the policy considerations underlying 
complete preemption.  The Supreme Court recently said that ERISA’s 
preemptive force “mirror[s]” that of § 301 of the Labor Management Relations 
Act (“LMRA”), which is the statute most commonly found to circumvent the 
well-pleaded complaint rule through complete preemption.  Aetna Health Inc. v. 
Davila, __ U.S. __, 124 S.Ct. 2488, 2496 (2004); Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 
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uniform regulatory regime over employee benefit plans.”40  Accordingly, 
Section 514(a) states that ERISA “shall supersede any and all State laws 
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.”41  
ERISA’s “extraordinary pre-emptive power” is necessary because “[t]he 
policy choices reflected in the inclusion of certain remedies and the 
exclusion of others under the federal scheme would be completely 
undermined if ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries were free to obtain 
remedies under state law that Congress rejected” when enacting the 
statute.42  Hence, “any state-law cause of action that duplicates, 
supplements, or supplants the ERISA civil enforcement remedy conflicts 
with the clear congressional intent to make the ERISA remedy exclusive 
and is therefore pre-empted.”43  As the Supreme Court’s discussion of 
ERISA makes clear, complete preemption is only found when permitting 
state remedies to infringe on a federal law’s legislative domain would 
completely undermine Congress’s purpose in enacting the statute.  
II. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT FINDS COMPLETE PREEMPTION 
¶15 Steven Bastien’s lawsuit against AT&T Wireless Services began 
just like the many other consumer lawsuits brought against wireless service 
providers in the late 1990’s.  Little could anyone have known that his case 
would have such a profound affect on the wireless litigation landscape.  
Bastien, a Chicago resident, signed up for AT&T’s wireless service in 1998, 
but soon became dissatisfied with the service’s coverage.44  The poor 
coverage provided by AT&T’s network caused many of Bastien’s calls to 
be “dropped,” or cut off in mid-call.45  Upset about the number of dropped 
calls, and the fact that he was charged for each one, Bastien filed a 
complaint with the FCC.46  The FCC told him that it could not provide any 
assistance because AT&T was not in violation of any FCC regulations.47  
Having no other avenue of relief, Bastien filed a complaint in Illinois state 
court, alleging that AT&T breached its service contract and violated various 
provisions of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act.48 
                                                                                                                       
482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (“the complete pre-emption corollary…is applied 
primarily in cases raising claims pre-empted by § 301 of the LMRA.”).     
40 Aetna, 124 S. Ct. at 2495.   
41 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000). 
42 Aetna, 124 S. Ct. at 2495. 
43 Id. 
44 Bastien v. AT&T Wireless Svcs., Inc., 205 F.3d 983, 985 (7th Cir. 2000). 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. (citing 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2). 
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¶16 Arguing that Congress had expressly preempted state regulation of 
rates and market entry for wireless service in Section 332 of the FCA, 
AT&T removed the case to federal court.49  Bastien had carefully couched 
his complaint only in terms of Illinois state law, and accordingly moved to 
remand the case back to state court due to lack of federal subject matter 
jurisdiction.50  Finding complete preemption, the district court judge denied 
Bastien’s motion to remand.51  Bastien appealed to the Seventh Circuit, 
which affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to remand, but 
dismissed the case on other grounds.52 
¶17 Like the other courts that have dealt with similar claims, the 
Seventh Circuit had to reconcile the express preemption of state laws 
regulating rates and market entry in Section 332, and the savings clause in 
Section 414.  The court chose to read the savings clause narrowly, reasoning 
that “[t]o read the clause expansively would abrogate the very federal 
regulation of mobile telephone providers that the act intended to create.”53  
Thus, the court concluded that  
The two clauses read together create separate spheres of responsibility, 
one exclusively federal and the other allowing concurrent state and 
federal regulation.  Cases that involved “the entry of or the rates 
charged by any commercial mobile service or any private mobile 
service” are the province of federal regulators and courts . . . .  The 
states remain free to regulate “other terms and conditions” of mobile 
telephone service.54  
¶18 While this conclusion alone was not extraordinary, what was 
remarkable, at least compared to the holdings of other courts, was the 
Seventh Circuit’s expansive reading of what constituted regulation of “the 
entry of or the rates charged” by wireless service providers.  Relying on the 
Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Co. v. Central Office Telephone,55 
which dealt with long-distance telephone rates, the court reasoned that “a 
complaint that service quality is poor is really an attack on the rates charged 
for the service and may be treated as a federal case regardless of whether 
the issue was framed in terms of state law.”56  Additionally, the court held 
                                                     
49 Id. at 985-86. 
50 Id. at 986. 
51 Id.; Bastien v. AT&T Wireless Svcs., Inc., No. 99 C 49, 1999 WL 259939, at 
*4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 21, 1999). 
52 Bastien, 205 F.3d at 986. 
53 Id. at 987. 
54 Id. 
55 524 U.S. 214 (1998). 
56 Bastien, 205 F.3d at 988 (citing Cent. Office Tel., 524 U.S. at 223 (“Any claim 
for excessive rates can be couched as a claim for inadequate services and vice 
versa.”)). 
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that since the quality of service is directly related to the number of cellular 
towers and other infrastructure, an attack on service quality is preempted by 
the FCC’s regulation of the terms of market entry.57  Thus, the court 
determined that Bastien’s complaint was actually an attack on the rates 
charged for service, the terms on which AT&T entered the Chicago market, 
and the FCC-approved schedule for building cellular towers and 
establishing service in the Chicago area.  Since the FCA expressly preempts 
state regulation of rates and market entry, the court held that the state law 
breach of contract and consumer fraud claims were removable to federal 
court.58 
¶19 The impact of Bastien was felt almost immediately in courts 
throughout the country.  Wireless service providers had been arguing for 
some time that the standard applied to long distance telephone rates in 
Central Office Telephone should be applied to wireless regulations.59  Now 
a circuit court had finally agreed with them. Within a few weeks of the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Bastien, state courts in California and New 
York held that breach of contract claims touched upon rates and were 
therefore preempted by the FCA.60  Some federal district courts, mostly 
within the Seventh Circuit, also followed the Bastien court’s complete 
preemption analysis.61  Many others, however, did not.62  They instead 
chose to follow the Second Circuit’s narrower reading of Section 332.  Yet, 
                                                     
57 Id. (citing 47 C.F.R. §§ 24.103 (geographic and population coverage 
requirements), 24.132 (narrowband antenna power and height requirements)). 
58 Id. at 989-90.  The court’s conclusion was bolstered by the fact that Bastien’s 
allegations of fraud and misrepresentation were conclusory and contained few 
supporting facts.  Rather, the factual allegations in the complaint mostly 
suggested that AT&T had not sufficiently built up its wireless network. 
59 See In re Wireless Consumer Alliance, Inc., 15 F.C.C.R. 17021, 17029 n. 47 
(2000) (“CMRS providers regularly cite filed rate cases [which apply to land-
line telephone service] in support of their position.”).  
60 Union Ink Co., Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 801 A.2d 361, 372 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2002) (citing Ball v. GTE Mobilnet, 81 Cal. App. 4th 529 (2000); Naevus 
Int’l, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 713 N.Y.S.2d 642 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000)). 
61 See, e.g., Phillips v. AT&T Wireless, No. 4:04-CV-40240, 2004 WL 1737385, 
at *6 (S.D. Iowa July 29, 2004); Franczyk v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, No. 03 C 
6473, 2004 WL 178395, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 21, 2004); Alport v. Sprint Corp., 
No. 03 C 6246, 2003 WL 22872134, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 2003); Aubrey v. 
Ameritech Mobile Comms., No. 00-75080, 2002 WL 32521813, at *3 (E.D. 
Mich. June 17, 2002).  But see Fedor v. Cingular Wireless Corp., 355 F.3d 1069, 
1073 (7th Cir. 2004) (distinguishing, but not overruling, Bastien). 
62 See, e.g., Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001); In re 
Wireless Tel. Radio Frequency Emissions Prods. Liab. Litig., 327 F. Supp. 2d 
554, 565-66 (D. Md. 2004); Lewis v. Nextel Comms., Inc., 281 F. Supp. 2d 
1302, 1305-06 (N.D. Ala. 2003); Gattegno v. Sprint Corp., 297 F. Supp. 2d 372, 
377 (D. Mass. 2003). 
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in courts throughout the country, wireless service providers continue to cite 
Bastien in support of their motions to dismiss state law claims and remove 
them to federal court on complete preemption grounds.63  Hence, four years 
after Bastien was decided, its holding is still vigorously disputed in 
consumer lawsuits against wireless service providers. 
III. MISAPPLICATION OF THE COMPLETE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE? 
¶20 Since it was decided, Bastien has been criticized on numerous 
grounds.  Although it is often criticized for its broad interpretation of “rates 
and market entry,” few courts have addressed the Bastien court’s 
application of the complete preemption doctrine to circumvent the well-
pleaded complaint rule.  In this area, as the Eleventh Circuit noted in Smith 
v. GTE Corp.,64 Bastien has caused “a substantial amount of confusion 
between the complete preemption doctrine and the broader and more 
familiar doctrine of ordinary preemption.”65  Even if Bastien’s claims were 
preempted, the Seventh Circuit misapplied the complete preemption 
doctrine by permitting their removal to federal court.  Instead, the Seventh 
Circuit should have remanded Bastien’s claims back to state court where 
AT&T’s preemption defense belonged.  
A. Congressional Intent 
¶21 Congressional intent is the “touchstone” of a federal district court’s 
removal jurisdiction.66  Removal by complete preemption is therefore only 
permitted when “Congress has clearly manifested an intent” to make a 
specific action within a particular field subject to federal jurisdiction.67  No 
such intent can be found in the FCA.  The Seventh Circuit thus erred in 
applying the complete preemption doctrine to Bastien’s breach of contract 
and state fraud claims and by permitting their removal to federal court.   
¶22 The Bastien court’s improper application of the complete 
preemption doctrine is best seen when compared with the Supreme Court’s 
analysis of other statutes found to have the preemptive force necessary to 
circumvent the well-pleaded complaint rule.  The most recent case finding a 
                                                     
63 See, e.g., Wireless Tel. Radio, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 565 n.16 (“defendants...have 
relied on Bastien in their briefs”); Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits, Bryceland v. 
AT&T Corp., 114 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. App. 2002), appeal docketed, No. 03-0948 
(Tex. April 9, 2004) (relying on Bastien to argue that plaintiff’s state law claims 
were preempted by the FCA).  Brief is available at 2004 WL 874837, at *13. 
64 236 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2001). 
65 Id. at 1313 (discussing preemption in the context of a claim arising under FCA 
§ 207). 
66 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66 (1987). 
67 Marcus v. AT&T Corp., 138 F.3d 46, 54 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Metro. Life, 
481 U.S. at 66). 
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new area of complete preemption is Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson,68 
which dealt with the National Bank Act’s69 (“NBA”) preemption of state 
usury claims against national banks.70  The Court in Beneficial began its 
analysis by stating that the focus of the complete preemption inquiry is on 
whether the NBA “provide[s] the exclusive cause of action” for such 
claims.71  The Court found that it did, reasoning that “[b]ecause §§ 85 and 
86 provide the exclusive cause of action for such claims, there is, in short, 
no such thing as a state-law claim of usury against a national bank.”72  
Central to the Court’s analysis were early cases decided soon after the 
passage of the NBA holding that the NBA formed a comprehensive system 
of usury regulations and “the power to supplement it by State legislation is 
conferred neither expressly nor by implication.”73  The Court also 
recognized the importance of “[u]niform [national] rules limiting the 
liability of national banks and prescribing exclusive remedies for their 
overcharges,” which are needed to protect the banking system from 
“possible unfriendly State legislation.”74   
¶23 Unlike the Beneficial Court, the Bastien court failed to engage in a 
comprehensive analysis of the legislative intent behind the FCA’s 
preemption clause.  Had the court done so, it would have identified several 
factors indicating Congress intended only ordinary preemption.  Each will 
be addressed in turn. 
1.  Savings Clause   
¶24 The first, and perhaps most obvious, factor limiting the FCA’s 
preemption power is the savings clause.  None of the statutes that have 
previously been found to have the preemptive force necessary for complete 
preemption, such as Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act 
(“LMRA”)75 and ERISA, have such extensive limitations on their 
preemption powers.76  In contrast to the Beneficial Court’s conclusion that 
                                                     
68 539 U.S. 1 (2003) 
69 12 U.S.C. §§ 85-86 (2000). 
70 Beneficial, 539 U.S. at 3-4.  It is not uncommon for courts to evaluate the 
preemptive force of a statute by comparing it to the language of other statutes 
that have also been found to completely preempt state law claims.  See Metro. 
Life Ins., 481 U.S. at 65-66 (comparing the language of the LMRA and ERISA 
to determine ERISA’s preemptive force). 
71 Beneficial, 539 U.S. at 9.  
72 Id. at 11. 
73 Id. at 10 (quoting Farmers’ and Mechanics’ Nat’l Bank. v. Dearing, 91 U.S. 
29, 35 (1875)).  
74 Id. (quoting Tiffany v. Nat’l Bank. of Mo., 85 U.S. 409, 412 (1874)).    
75 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2000). 
76 See Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. SAVC 03-130, 2003 WL 21530185, at 
*6 (C.D. Cal. April 18, 2003) (lack of savings clauses in LMRA and ERISA is 
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there is no such thing as a state law usury claim, the existence of the FCA’s 
savings clause, the Smith court explained, “contemplates the application of 
state-law and the exercise of state-court jurisdiction” and “counsels against 
a conclusion that the purpose behind the [FCA] was to replicate” the 
preemptive force found in ERISA and the LMRA.77  Had Congress intended 
to completely preempt all state law claims that even remotely involve the 
setting of rates, as the Bastien court held, such an expansive savings clause 
would not have been included. 
2.  No Fear of State Interference 
¶25 Unlike other statutes that completely preempt state regulations in 
their respective fields, there is no evidence that Congress feared state 
intrusion in wireless regulation.78  One of the goals of the NBA was to 
protect the national banking systems from “unfriendly State litigation.”79  
Similarly, the “expansive pre-emption provisions” of ERISA “are intended 
to ensure that employee benefit plan regulation would be ‘exclusively a 
federal concern.’”80   
¶26 To the contrary, the FCA refuses to make wireless regulation an 
exclusively federal concern by explicitly providing for a substantial state 
role in regulating “other terms and conditions” of wireless service.81  
Notably, the House Committee Report accompanying the Omnibus Budget 
                                                                                                                       
indicative of limited FCA preemption).  Cf. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2000) 
(limiting ERISA’s preemption power specifically in the areas of insurance, 
banking, and securities). 
77 Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) (savings clause 
discussed in the context of § 207 of the FCA) (quoting Blab TV of Mobile, Inc. 
v. Comcast Cable Comm., Inc., 182 F.3d 851, 854 (11th Cir. 1999)).  See also 
Lewis v. Nextel Comm., 281 F.  Supp. 2d 1302, 1305 (N.D. Ala. 2003) 
(applying Smith to § 332). 
78 The FCC has been ambiguous in its view on the role of state CMRS 
regulation.  Compare In re Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the 
Communications Act,  9 F.C.C.R. 1411, 1421 (1994) (“While we recognize that 
states have a legitimate interest in protecting the interests of telecommunications 
users in their jurisdictions, we also believe that competition is a strong protector 
of these interests and that state regulation in this context could inadvertently 
become as a burden to the development of this competition.”) with In re 
Southwestern Bell Mobile Sys., Inc., 14 F.C.C.R. 19898, 19903 (1999) (“We 
therefore do not agree . . . [that the FCA’s] preference for competition over 
regulation results in a general exemption for the CMRS industry from the 
neutral application of state contractual or consumer fraud laws.”).  
79 Beneficial, 539 U.S. at 9. 
80 Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, __ U.S. __, 124 S.Ct. 2488, 2495 (2004) (quoting 
Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981).  See also ERISA 
§ 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (preemption provision).   
81 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A) (2000). 
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Reconciliation Act of 1993 specifically states that “consumer billing 
information and practices and billing disputes and other consumer 
protection matters” are subject to state regulation.82  Moreover, “Congress 
allowed a state to retain regulatory authority over CMRS rates on a showing 
that market conditions fail adequately to [sic] protect consumers.”83  Thus, 
as the Second Circuit recognized in Marcus, “while the FCA does evidence 
a federal interest in uniformity of charges in telecommunications, . . . it does 
not indicate a uniquely federal interest” in protecting customers from unfair 
business practices.84   
3.  Lack of Comprehensiveness 
¶27 The FCA’s preemptive force is also limited by its failure to 
establish a comprehensive legislative scheme for addressing all claims that 
relate to rates and market entry.  Unlike the NBA’s comprehensive system 
of usury regulations, the FCA’s causes of action only cover a limited piece 
of the telecommunications pie.   
¶28 Because of its limited scope, the FCA is not the exclusive remedy 
available to aggrieved consumers.  For instance, the FCA provides 
consumers with a federal cause of action to challenge a wireless provider’s 
unreasonable rates or inadequate service.85  It fails, however, “to provide 
any federal remedies for deceptive advertising or billing practices,” which 
are commonly covered by state law causes of action.86  This negates a “vital 
feature” of complete preemption, which is the existence of a federal remedy 
replacing all preempted state causes of action.87  Consequently, the FCA not 
only fails to manifest a clear Congressional intent to preempt state law 
consumer protection claims, it actually “evidences Congress's intent to 
allow such claims to proceed under state law.”88 
                                                     
82 H.R. Rep. No. 103-111 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 588.    
83 Conn. Dept of Pub. Util. Control v. FCC, 78 F.3d 842, 850 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 332(c)(3)(A)(i) & (B) (Sup. V 1993)). 
84 Marcus v. AT&T Corp., 138 F.3d 46, 54 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal citations 
omitted).  See also Cedar Rapids Cellular Tel., L.P. v. Miller, 280 F.3d 874, 880 
(8th Cir. 2002) (citing California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101 (1989)) 
(“States have a long history of regulating against unfair business practices.”).   
85 Moriconi v. AT&T Wireless PCS, LLC, 280 F. Supp. 2d 867, 874 (E.D. Ark 
2003).  See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 207 (2000) (establishing a federal cause of action 
for persons injured by FCA violations). 
86 Moriconi, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 874.  
87 King v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 425 (4th Cir. 2003). 
88 Marcus, 138 F.3d at 54.  See also Moriconi, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 874 (“The 
statutory language, the legislative history, and the savings clause compel the 
conclusion that Congress envisioned that consumers would not be deprived of 
their state law causes of action for consumer related fraud.”). 
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4.  Similarities to Ordinary Preemption Statutes 
¶29 Rather than bearing much similarity to statutes found to completely 
preempt state law claims such as the NBA and ERISA, the FCA’s 
preemption provision more closely resembles statutes recently found to 
contain only ordinary preemption powers.  One of these statutes is the 
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (“FCLAA”),89 which, as the 
Supreme Court recently recognized in Lorillard Tobacco, preempts certain 
state laws regulating cigarette advertising through ordinary preemption.90  
The FCLAA’s preemption clause provides that “[n]o requirement or 
prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law 
with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages 
of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this chapter.”91 
¶30 Interpreting the scope of the FCLAA’s preemption powers, the 
Supreme Court concluded that although the FCLAA prohibits state 
regulation of cigarette advertising, the statute “still leaves significant power 
in the hands of States to impose generally applicable zoning regulations and 
to regulate conduct.”92  The Court noted a Senate Report that explained that 
the FCLAA’s preemption clause  
[W]ould in no way affect the power of any State . . . with respect to the 
taxation or the sale of cigarettes to minors, or the prohibition of 
smoking in public buildings, or similar police regulations.  It is limited 
entirely to State or local requirements or prohibitions in the advertising 
of cigarettes.93   
¶31 Comparing the language of the FCA to both the FCLAA and the 
NBA reveals that the FCA has much more in common with the former than 
the latter.  The limited language of the FCLAA’s preemption clause and the 
qualifications on its preemption power noted in the accompanying Senate 
Report closely resemble the FCA’s preemption clause and House Budget 
Committee Report.  Like the FCA, the FCLAA exhibits no fear of state 
interference and in fact envisions a substantial state role in cigarette 
regulation.  The narrow scope of these statutes is strikingly different from 
the broad preemption clauses contained in statutes such as the NBA and 
ERISA.   
¶32 These differences strongly suggest that Congress intended the 
FCA’s preemption clause to only support the ordinary preemption of 
specific state law claims.  The FCA clearly envisions states having a 
                                                     
89 15 U.S.C. § 1331, et seq. (2000). 
90 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 551 (2001). 
91 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (2000). 
92 Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 551. 
93 Id. at 552 n.* (quoting S. Rep. No. 91-566 (1969), reprinted in 1970 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2652, 2663). 
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substantial role in wireless regulation.  It was therefore a misapplication of 
the Supreme Court’s preemption jurisprudence for the Seventh Circuit to 
circumvent the well-pleaded complaint rule by permitting the removal of 
Bastien’s state law claims to federal court.   
B. Statutory Context 
¶33 The Bastien court’s misapplication of the complete preemption 
doctrine is at least partially explained by its failure to interpret the FCA’s 
Section 322 preemption clause in its proper statutory context.  The Supreme 
Court recently reiterated that when interpreting statutory language that may 
be ambiguous, “[i]t is a ‘fundamental canon of statutory construction that 
the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their 
place in the overall statutory scheme.’”94  Yet, the Bastien court’s heavy 
reliance on Central Office Telephone reflects a misunderstanding of Section 
332’s proper context within the FCA’s regulatory regime. 
¶34 The court in Central Office Telephone held that the filed-tariff 
requirements of the FCA preempted a plaintiff’s state law claims against 
AT&T’s long-distance telephone service.95  Under the FCA, common 
carriers are “required to file with the FCC ‘schedules,’ i.e., tariffs, ‘showing 
all charges’ and ‘showing the classifications, practices, and regulations 
affecting such charges.’”96  Consequently, the “filed rate doctrine forbids a 
regulated entity from charging rates ‘for its services other than those 
properly filed with the appropriate federal regulatory authority.’”97     
¶35 Unlike their land-line cousins, wireless service providers do not 
have to file rate schedules with the FCC.  Instead, the FCA envisions 
wireless rate setting through market competition.98  The FCC has 
accordingly held that the filed rate doctrine is inapplicable to wireless 
service.99  It was therefore inappropriate for the Seventh Circuit to 
extrapolate Congress’s preemptive intent from a case arising under the filed 
rate doctrine to a case concerning wireless regulation.  Hence, the court read 
the ambiguous language of the FCA’s preemption clause out of context and 
without proper reference to its overall place in the FCA’s statutory scheme.   
                                                     
94 Food and Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 
133 (2000) (quoting Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 
(1989)). 
95 AT&T Co. v. Cent. Office Tel., 524 U.S. 214, 228 (1998).   
96 Id. at 221 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2000)). 
97 In re Wireless Consumers Alliance, Inc., 15 F.C.C.R. 17021, 17029 (2000) 
(quoting Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577 (1981)). 
98 See id. at 17032 (“the CMRS-customer relationship” is governed “by the 
mechanisms of a competitive marketplace”).   
99 See id. (“[T]he argument of CMRS providers ignores the fact that the filed 
rate cases arose under a totally different regulatory regime . . . .”).   
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¶36 Interpreting ambiguous language out of context increases the 
danger of misinterpreting Congress’s true intention.  This is particularly true 
when dealing with the complete preemption doctrine, where Congressional 
intent is of paramount importance.  It is quite possible, for instance, that 
because the FCA gives the FCC a greater role in land-line rate setting 
(through rate filing) than in wireless rate setting, Congress intended the 
preemptive force of land-line regulation to be greater than that of wireless 
regulation.  Accordingly, the interpretations of the statutes’ respective 
preemption clauses are not interchangeable.  The Bastien court’s reliance on 
Central Office Telephone thus meant that its interpretive signals were 
crossed, making an improper result almost inevitable.  
CONCLUSION 
¶37 In light of Beneficial and Lorillard Tobacco, it is clear that the 
Bastien court misapplied the complete preemption analysis in finding that 
Steven Bastien’s state law claims were removable to federal court.  
Although his claims may indeed have been preempted by federal law, 
Congress did not intend for the FCA to have the same extraordinary 
preemptive power contained in the NBA, ERISA, and the LMRA.  Unlike 
these latter statutes, the FCA’s preemption power is limited by its savings 
clause, failure to establish a comprehensive regulatory scheme, and 
provision of a significant role for state regulation.  The FCA instead closely 
resembles statutes such as the FCLAA that only possess ordinary 
preemption powers.  The Seventh Circuit should therefore have remanded 
Bastien’s case back to state court for further adjudication.100 
¶38 As similar issues are sure to be litigated for some time, courts 
attempting to reconcile Bastien should keep its missteps in mind.  Federal 
courts can avoid a messy attempt at defining the scope of FCA preemption 
by adhering to the well-pleaded complaint rule and remanding cases to state 
court.   State courts could then use the ordinary preemption analysis to 
evaluate claims on a case by case basis.  If Congress really meant to make 
all state law claims affecting rates and market entry an exclusively federal 
concern removable to federal court, it must pass legislation explicitly stating 
this intent.101   
                                                     
100 See Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) (“our 
conclusion that the complete preemption doctrine does not provide a basis for 
federal jurisdiction in this action [arising under 47 U.S.C. § 207] does not 
preclude the parties from litigation about the preemptive effect . . . of the . . . 
[FCA] in any subsequent state court action.”). 
101 See, e.g., El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 484 (1999) 
(explaining that the Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2) (2000), 
expressly provides for removal of tort actions arising out of nuclear accidents to 
federal court even when they assert only state law claims). 
